One of the fundamental elements of successful combat through the ages has been an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy and how that knowledge can best be applied. As machines have changed warfare into an impersonal contest of whose inventions can kill the most people, it has become critical for one country to invest effort and manpower into figuring out what inventions an enemy might field against it.

World War I introduced a new domain of warfare: the air. Embattled countries sought an edge in technology, assuming that could lead to a faster victory. One such technological battle was the development of the synchronized aircraft machine gun.

With an understanding that an easily aimed machine gun provided the best offensive punch in an air battle, the French ace Roland Garros mounted a machine gun that fired through the propeller of his Morane-Saulnier monoplane. To protect his propeller from the inevitable bullet strikes, he attached metal plates to the propeller blade. About 1 in 10 bullets ricocheted off the plates, yet most of the shots went toward the enemy aircraft. His invention proved a great success and he became the first French ace of the war.

After being forced down behind enemy lines and captured before he could burn his mount, Garros found his invention drawing great attention from German technicians. In trying to copy his idea, they learned that German steel-jacketed bullets did more damage to the props than French bullets, so they needed to examine another alternative.

Anthony Fokker studied the problem and devised a synchronization system that enabled the gun to fire through the propeller arc. He literally made it so the engine fired the gun. This decreased the gun’s rate of fire, yet improved accuracy and lethality significantly. After great success with this device on his Eindecker fighter, Fokker saw his invention fall into the hands of the enemy, inspiring them to develop their own system.

Such competition occurred throughout the war. The United States did not participate in this technological war because it entered the war late in its course and lacked technical innovation. The United States had to put forth a great deal of effort to provide only a small fraction of the combat aircraft that participated in the war. The real need for the United States to develop a better understanding of military employment of aircraft predated the beginning of our participation in that first air war.

As Europe marched toward war in the early 1900’s, nations raced to develop advanced aircraft. American aviation lagged behind that of the European nations technically, industrially, and militarily. As early as 1912, the aviation visionary Major William “Billy” Mitchell saw the need to gain information about the military aircraft of other nations. As Chief of the European Intelligence Section of the War Department, Mitchell witnessed the rapid development of the airplane as a military weapon. During the First Balkan War, Bulgarian pilots carried out the world’s first bombing
mission. On 16 October 1912, Albatros F-2 aircraft attacked the railway station at Adrianople, Turkey. Later, Greek pilots bombed Turkish positions with modified grenades. They also attacked Turkish warships in the Dardanelles.

Air power had possibilities, although the US Army leadership did not see a place for an armed aircraft in its plans for a land battle. Because of the shortsighted attitudes of the Army General Staff, the United States had a long way to go before fielding a potent air force.

This lack of military aviation preparedness became evident even before the United States actually entered the fight in Europe. During the 1916 Punitive Expedition, American aircraft supported General John J. Pershing’s troops chasing Pancho Villa throughout northern Mexico. The underpowered Curtis JN4 “Jenny” biplanes proved ineffective in the high altitudes of Mexico. Although pilots flew some successful reconnaissance missions, the aircraft were most useful for carrying mail and messages between American Army elements. On the eve of US entry into World War I, the Army had practically no material, personnel, or experience in designing, producing, or using aeronautical equipment. With an almost nonexistent air component, the military establishment was slow to develop an air technical intelligence mission.

**United States Enters World War I**

The United States entered World War I on 6 April 1917, and literally had to start its combat air capability from scratch. The greatest industrial nation in the world did not own a single fighter aircraft, although the Aviation Section of the US Army Signal Corps did have 55 trainers. Manpower stood at 131 officers and 1,087 enlisted men. The officer corps consisted mainly of trained pilots and men training to get their wings, yet a mere 26 carried the qualified rating of Junior Military Aviator. This situation began to change after France requested help with expanding the air war over Europe. Premier Alexandre F. Robot sent a cable to President Woodrow Wilson in May 1917 that communicated France’s desire for American assistance, yet ultimately provided a starting point for Congress and the military to create an entity that today is the most powerful air force on the planet.

By July 1917, money came from three bills passed by Congress and signed by President Wilson which provided more than $694 million to create the American air combat force. However, the actual application of these funds and the question of how to best use them were much more complicated than originally planned. The French requested the United States to provide 16,500 aircraft, 5,000 trained pilots, and 50,000 maintenance personnel to the war effort. These numbers proved to be absurd because US aircraft production capability was in no way prepared for such a requirement.

The United States had much to learn about military aircraft production as it entered the Great War. Consequently, Major General George O. Squier, head of the Army Signal Corps Aviation Section, invited engineers from England, France, and Italy to visit the United States, and he sent over 100 American engineers to Europe to gain practical experience. General Squier also organized the first air technical intelligence (ATI) mission: the Bolling Commission. Under the direction of Colonel Raynal C. Bolling, military and industrial experts traveled to Europe in June 1917 to investigate European technology and recommend the types of aircraft and equipment that the United States should produce. In July, the first foreign aircraft—a British De Haviland-4—arrived in New York for comprehensive study.

The US Army’s effort to improve its aircraft production capability included building an Airplane Engineering Department under the Signal Corps. Influenced by Dayton industrialist Edward A. Deeds, the Army Signal Corps selected a site north of Dayton, Ohio to build this aviation
engineering and testing center. By locating this function in Dayton, the Army placed its aeronautical engineers “within a night’s ride of Indianapolis, Detroit, Buffalo, Cleveland, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Washington, and the East.” The department moved from Washington, D.C. and set up temporarily in the Lindsey building in downtown Dayton, then relocated to McCook Field, which officially opened on 4 December 1917.

The missions of the Airplane Engineering Department included the evaluation of foreign scientific and technical programs related to aircraft. This represented the rudimentary beginning of scientific and technical intelligence in the nation’s “Air Force.” One of the sections that moved to McCook Field in 1917 was the Technical Data Section, which was “established in 1917 to study both foreign and domestic airplanes and aircraft engines.” This name did not survive the move, although it appeared again later in the history of the function.

The missions of the Airplane Engineering Department included the evaluation of foreign scientific and technical programs related to aircraft. This represented the rudimentary beginning of scientific and technical intelligence in the nation’s “Air Force.” One of the sections that moved to McCook Field in 1917 was the Technical Data Section, which was “established in 1917 to study both foreign and domestic airplanes and aircraft engines.” This name did not survive the move, although it appeared again later in the history of the function.

A November 1917 organization chart shows a Mr. E. H. Sherbondy serving as the head of the Foreign Data Section of the Airplane Engineering Department. The section’s work centered on collecting information on foreign aircraft capabilities, editorial work, exhibits, photography, and statistical recognition; maintaining a library of technical works and history; and even handling public relations.

The history and public relations functions may have been “additional duties” that came down to the unit as a result of the expertise of its personnel. Captain Blee wrote a history of the Airplane Engineering Division in 1919, which may have been the beginning of the historical mission. A speech prepared by Mr. Thomas McMahon, head of the organization during 1922-1928, to keep McCook Field from closing may have marked the beginning of the public relations function. The unit provided historical and public relations support to all of units of the Army Air Forces in the Dayton area, working primarily with the Headquarters Army Air Forces Materiel Center.

A final mission area of the Foreign Data Section involved making motion picture studies of engineering experiments being carried out by the Materiel Center. This, in turn, grew to the point where the unit would produce educational and historical films for the Army Air Forces during World War II.

The first of many organizational redesignations occurred in 1918, as the Foreign Data Section became the Technical Publications and Library Department. Technical Publications acted as a clearinghouse for technical data and information, both internally to the Airplane Engineering Department and externally to business, education, and military organizations. Under the leadership of Captain Harry Harmon Blee, the department procured, cross-indexed, and made available all known European and American aviation-related technical data.

The unit also prepared a weekly summary of technical articles appearing in aeronautical publications, translated foreign documents into English, and published a monthly “Bulletin of the Experimental Department, Airplane Engineering Division.” The library obtained approximately 5,000 foreign and domestic technical reports and documents, and began the work of foreign language translations. By 1920, the department once again became the Technical Data Section and was the recognized Army point of contact between the Army and the American aviation industry for the dissemination of aviation-related technical information.

Between the World Wars

Because of the technical expertise of the McCook Field engineers, Dayton became the nation’s center for the study of foreign aircraft technology. Following World War I, the armistice with Germany brought 347 aircraft to the United States for technical study and as war relics. This movement of enemy aircraft to the Miami Valley created a situation where former foe aircraft, such as the formidable Fokker D-VII biplane, could be seen flying over McCook Field and the surrounding area. In addition to captured German aircraft, the Technical Data Section acquired British, French, and Italian planes and a collection of engines, machine guns and aerial cannons, navigation equipment, parachutes, and aircraft manufacturing machinery.

In 1927, the missions at McCook Field moved across town to Wright Field (today, Area B of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base), near Riverside, Ohio. Technical Data Section personnel settled into offices in the second floor of building 11. From all the war materiel brought back to Dayton, an aeronautical museum evolved, initially as part of the section. This was the beginning of the National Museum of the US Air Force, a museum the entire world knows about today.
Almost from its beginning in the summer of 1918, supervision of the Army’s air museum function was a Technical Data responsibility. Foreign airplanes and aeronautical equipment sent from Europe after World War I were stored at McCook Field from 1918 on. For many years, the museum existed without operating regulations. A quantity of materiel was gradually accumulated but never properly arranged or classified for convenient study, and it suffered considerably from deterioration.

The museum functions were transferred to Wright Field in 1927, and from then until 1930, the collections were scattered, lost, or destroyed, until practically nothing remained but a collection of obsolete engines. Interest in the museum was revived in 1931, and Army Regulation 95-40, dated 30 September 1931, formally created the Army Aeronautical Museum. It occupied the new ornate $275,000 Aeronautical Museum building (building 12) from the spring of 1935 until 1942, when the museum exhibits were moved and stored in several buildings on Wright Field.

From 1935 to 1942, building 12 housed the Army Aeronautical Museum’s administrative offices, museum exhibits, technical laboratories, library, and photographic and motion picture labs. In this early museum organization, the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) and the current National Museum of the US Air Force actually share a common heritage. In 1945, some of the old museum exhibits were shipped to Freeman Field, Seymour, Indiana, which was supposed to be the permanent museum headquarters of the Army Air Force. Although the mid-1930’s saw the scientific and technical intelligence mission serving as an official collection of World War I relics, world events foreshadowed the tragic event that would require the expansion of this type of technical information.

In the actions leading up to World War II, the European and Japanese aircraft and armament industries again surpassed ours. A Russian aircraft held the long-distance straight-line flight record and the Italians owned the altitude record. German pilots had flown faster than anyone else and, by 1939, had demonstrated the viability of a turbojet. It was also during the 1930’s that the Italians sharpened their warfighting skills in Ethiopia, the Germans in Spain, and the Japanese in Manchuria. The United States was not ready for what was coming.

Road to World War II: Technical Data Branch and Technical Data Section

The heritage of NASIC today is one of obtaining detailed knowledge of the world’s aviation technology. Throughout the early years at McCook Field and Wright Field, one of the goals of the units that preceded today’s Center was to provide that kind of detailed information utilizing the existing engineering expertise. Information on all types of aviation technologies interested these early organizations because the United States was catching up to the rest of the world for many of the years prior to World War II and we needed to study how things were done elsewhere. The organization that took technical information, or “intelligence,” into World War II was the Technical Data Branch at Wright Field.

With the ever-increasing need to gain information about foreign aircraft, Materiel Division de-emphasized the museum function at Wright Field, renaming its air intelligence function the Technical Data Branch in February 1940. The Technical Data Branch collected and reviewed aeronautical publications from all over the world and ensured the engineers and workers in Materiel Division had access to this information. This involved translating numerous foreign documents and providing reports in publications such as the Technical News Service and the Technical Data Digest. The engineers at Wright Field were not the only beneficiaries of the information. The Army provided lectures, exhibits, and films to the general public highlighting the technological advancements happening at Wright Field. The branch even created informational handbooks to educate private aeronautical enthusiasts.

By February 1941, the Technical Data Branch held a wide range of responsibilities as it served the Administrative Section of the Materiel Division. Its organization consisted of the Army Aeronautical Museum and separate departments for public relations, motion pictures, still pictures, technical publications, and the library. Although this seems an odd combination, several of these missions are found in technical intelligence today, including a collection of enemy equipment.

In a July 1941 reorganization, the Technical Data Branch became the Technical Data Section. In the following months, the library and technical publication missions merged and the Technical Data Digest publication and
foreign translation responsibilities moved from public relations to the newly formed reference branch. From less than 100 people assigned in July 1941, the Technical Data Section mission would grow dramatically during the war years, until nearly 750 people were assigned by December 1945.

Army Aeronautical Scientific and Technical Intelligence in WWII: Technical Data Laboratory

With the outbreak of World War II, the importance of technical intelligence took on new significance and the craft of obtaining information from equipment captured in the field became serious business. The British led the way in this endeavor after they entered the war, providing both experience and enemy equipment to the United States. In March 1942, the Materiel Division became Materiel Command, consisting of the Engineering Division and the Production Division, both based at Wright Field. The Engineering Division held responsibility for evaluation of foreign equipment.

Throughout most of 1942, the division’s technical staff had the Foreign Developments Unit, which originated under the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence; yet on 3 December 1942, this became a major component of a new laboratory, the Technical Data Laboratory. The Technical Data Section made up the majority of the new laboratory’s resources. With a mission of “Procurement, evaluation and dissemination of technical information on foreign aircraft and aeronautical equipment, particularly enemy aircraft and equipment, of technical or military interest to the Engineering Division and American manufacturers producing Army Air Forces materiel,” this unit became the Army Air Force’s main source of technical information on enemy aircraft brought to the United States.

Within the Technical Data Laboratory were the offices of the laboratory chief, the technical executive, and the administrative executive; plus the administrative, motion picture, still photographic, reference, technical information and evaluation branches. The Evaluation Branch performed one of the major aspects of the work of the laboratory in its evaluation of foreign aircraft and equipment. The Motion Picture and Still Photographic branches furnished photographic services for all Materiel Command activities, including those at other Army Air Forces stations where Materiel Command projects were under test. The Reference Branch, which included the Wright Field libraries, was
charged with the procurement, evaluation, custody, and dissemination of technical data on aeronautics and allied subjects to authorized personnel of Wright Field and other interested agencies. The Technical Information Branch prepared three major Materiel Command publications besides the Technical Data Digest. The latter publication was started in 1930 as a monthly comprehensive survey of current technical literature of military or engineering interest to the command.

The foreign equipment responsibilities of the Evaluation Branch will live forever in the photos taken by the Still Photographic Branch of the early aircraft brought to Wright Field for evaluation. The “EB” designator on the tails of many of the aircraft carried the initials of the unit. As a part of this evaluation mission, Wright Field test pilots flew the aircraft, most of the time in newly marked US colors.

One of the more famous flights took place in November 1943, when the Chief of the Technical Data Laboratory, Colonel John M. Haywood, flew the Japanese A6M5 Zero fighter coded as “EB-201” to Wright Field after its capture at Buna, New Guinea and subsequent shipment to Australia and the United States for study. This aircraft initially carried the code name “Hamp,” but this later changed to “Zeke 32.”

The Technical Data Laboratory also trained Army officers to collect equipment and information from the battlefield. In the fall of 1942, the first 12 “Air Force” officers to receive ATI field collection training were assigned to Wright Field for training in the technical aspects of “crash” intelligence. This course utilized laboratory directors and Squadron Leader Colley, from the British Royal Air Force, who identified the types of information that could be obtained from equipment marking plates, such as temperature or pressure ranges. The students also learned to gather air order of battle information from squadron markings.

One officer who attended this training, William D. McGarey, went to the Air Ministry in London and worked on German ball bearing markings. This lead to the intensive bombing efforts against ball bearing plants in 1943. Major McGarey later served in the Southwest Pacific. One early ATI program involved the collection of factory markings data and nameplates. During his tour, he personally inspected and removed the nameplates from some 1,000 Japanese aircraft. These plates provided one of the best sources of target data for manufacturing plants on the home islands of Japan.

Other requirements the Technical Data Laboratory fulfilled were detailing enemy aircraft performance characteristics and assessing every aircraft subsystem for the US and Allied nations’ combat forces. Whether it was engines, machine guns, bombsights, or radios, everything had to be examined and tested in minute detail. As frontline troops captured enemy equipment, they sent the materiel back to Wright Field for assessment. The first German and Japanese aircraft arrived in 1943, and captured equipment soon filled six buildings, a large outdoor storage area, and part of a flightline hangar. To allow its engineers to study this equipment, the Technical Data Laboratory closed its museum and stored the exhibits in two temporary wooden barns. As its mission grew, the laboratory also expanded physically.

In 1943, the Motion Picture Section took over building 30, the Photo Engineering Section moved into building 300, and the Camera Unit, Art Department, and the Supply Office occupied both floors of building 100-T (“temporary”). Materiel Command also assigned a B-25 to the Motion Picture Section to film test flights. In 1944, the Army Air Forces Materiel Command and the Air Service Command merged to form the Air Technical Service Command (ATSC).

**Getting the Equipment to Wright Field**

In November 1944, General Arnold directed that items of captured enemy equipment be collected from enemy countries so that technical experts could study this equipment and find out as much as possible about the enemy’s ideas and potentialities. His order was effective in all theaters of operation. About the same time, the best technical talent at Wright Field was busy compiling a “black list” of enemy equipment that was needed to insure tactical superiority of Army Air Forces’ equipment. This list was sent to the air technical intelligence or “crash” teams, which had been organized overseas under General Arnold’s directive.

The job of collection was begun as part of an overall program carried out by the Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee. It was devoted not only to the study of the enemy’s air weapons, but also to the study of all its weapons. These teams of investigation specialists were to pick up any equipment that, on examination and investigation, might disclose new ideas, new applications of existing ideas, simplification in the interests of manufacture and/or operation, and substitution of less strategic materials without loss of efficiency. In this way, the United States kept abreast of the air technical improvements of the enemy and was able to exploit the technical weaknesses of the enemy to Allied operational advantage.

Originally, each of these self-sustaining “crash” teams consisted of two or three persons in a jeep. They followed the ground armies and made on-the-spot field examinations of crashed or captured enemy aircraft, equipment, and documents. Collection was an area job with teams assigned to large commands, such as air forces, having a geographical responsibility. When word of an enemy crash came into Headquarters, the A-2 representative would remind the reporting unit to segregate and guard the enemy air person-
nel and equipment until the crash team arrived. He would then order the nearest of the air technical intelligence teams, which were billeted at strategic locations throughout the area, to the scene. When prisoners of war were taken, a prisoner of war interrogation team and a translator often accompanied the crash teams.

On reaching the scene of the crash or forced landing, the teams examined everything of an intelligence nature. Nameplates were taken from each piece of equipment, and items of further interest were segregated and shipped back for more detailed, possibly laboratory, examination. The teams prepared technical intelligence reports on their findings. They gave full accounts of their activities, documents found, interrogations made, and equipment salvaged. During the period from 15 December 1944 to 21 April 1945, over 165 reports received from the field teams were evaluated at A-2 and disseminated to US, British, and French sources.

As early as February 1945, however, it had become evident that the machinery of the Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee was too bulky and cumbersome for expeditious exploitation of intelligence targets. Dispatching of field teams by the 30-odd working parties (in charge of as many different categories of targets on the Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee’s “black list”) was much too complex, for the target situation by then was subject to change as the enemy evacuated or destroyed many plants as it retreated.

Accordingly, as a result of a meeting of the Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee’s Secretariat on 17 February 1945, a new procedure known as the Combined Army Forward Teams was inaugurated for the exploitation of “black list” targets. Under this system, the 30 categories of targets in the “black list” were divided into groups. Group 4 combined the categories of interest to the Air Forces as follows: aircraft, aircraft power plants, jet propulsion, and instruments and equipment.

The teams for the exploitation of each group of targets were to be stationed at the headquarters of each Army group. Personnel of the teams, selected from both American and British forces, were to be known as technical assessors. These teams were organized in London, and they proceeded to the continent in March 1945. The teams possessed complete dossiers on the known targets in their areas. The duty of the assessors was to determine the value of the target found and to decide whether or not additional specialists were required for efficient exploitation of the target. In actual practice, this procedure functioned so satisfactorily that, by V-E (Victory in Europe) Day, the Group 4 teams in both the 6th and 12th Army group areas had practically completed the survey of all known targets in their areas.

When the British were operating in Africa, “crash” intelligence teams were formed to secure technical intelligence data on foreign airplanes. No positive knowledge of German tactics was available during German operations in Sicily and Italy because, up to this point, the Germans were using their old equipment. When invasion started in France, the Allies did not find anything that would indicate what Germany was actually doing because France was being used for productive rather than experimental purposes. As the Allied armies advanced into enemy territory, however, the air technical intelligence teams, reinforced with technical experts hurriedly flown to Europe, examined and evaluated aeronaual factories and research establishments and even located documents in various hiding places.

After V-E Day, scientists and technicians from all branches of science, organized as technical intelligence teams, swarmed over Germany to obtain all information that might possibly be used to shorten the war with Japan. The Pacific war ended before any appreciable use could be made of the information obtained from the Germans, but the job of collecting went on. The whole method of collection, however, lacked general organization, although a better job was done in the Pacific theater than in Europe. The German aircraft and equipment of intelligence value, particularly new developments, were assembled at collection points for subsequent shipment to the United States, where they would be stored at Freeman Field, Seymour, Indiana.

**Operation LUSTY**

The most famous World War II technical intelligence missions in Europe were Operations LUSTY and PAPERCLIP. Operation LUSTY was the collection of German science and technology in whatever forms the participating teams could acquire. Whether it was jets, rocket planes, missiles, wind tunnels, or documentation, these teams followed the lists based on the requests of the Air Staff and experts at Wright Field. These teams visited over 500 sites, uncovering the secrets of the Third Reich by interviewing more than 2,500 German military and civilian technical experts and bringing home examples of every major aircraft and missile, plus 1,500 tons of documents.

Operation LUSTY brought fame to Colonel Harold E. Watson, twice commander of the Air Technical Intelligence Center. When Brigadier General George C. McDonald, Director of Intelligence for the United States Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF) in Europe, expanded the scope of Operation LUSTY in April 1945, Colonel Watson was assigned as chief of the Air Technical Intelligence teams. One of his greatest accomplishments took place when he and a group of hand-picked pilots, known as “Watson’s Whizzers,” gathered German Me-262 jet aircraft from Lechfeld, Germany and flew them to Cherbourg, France and put them on a British aircraft carrier, the *H.M.S. Reaper* bound for Newark, New Jersey. These were just a handful of the numerous

Colonel Donald L. Putt, Chief of Technical Services for USSTAF from October 1944 to August 1945, provided overall guidance for Project LUSTY and the collection of aircraft, equipment, and German technical documents in the European theater of operations. From Europe, Colonel Putt went stateside and headed the technical intelligence mission at Wright Field from September 1945 to December 1946. Two of his division chiefs were Colonel Watson, Collections Division; and Colonel Howard M. McCoy, Air Documents Division. After his intelligence tours, Colonel Putt eventually attained the rank of lieutenant general, serving as commander of the Air Research and Development Command in 1953 and, later, as Military Director of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board.

To help the Army Air Forces test the capabilities of these aircraft and engines, ATSC activated Freeman Field, Indiana as its Foreign Aircraft Evaluation Center. Eventually, the German aircraft, including V-1 and V-2 missiles, migrated to Freeman Field, and ATSC (later divided into Materiel and Research and Development Commands) tested the Japanese equipment at the Middletown Air Depot, located south of Dayton. By May 1946, 58 German aircraft, 129 Japanese aircraft, and 638 foreign aircraft engines were on hand at ATSC installations or en route. Foreign aircraft also went to Muroc (later, renamed Edwards) Air Force Base, California for flight-testing.

Operation PAPERCLIP, also under the direction of Colonel Putt (while Putt was in Europe and, later, at Wright Field) brought over 200 German scientists and technicians to Wright Field for collaboration with their American counterparts. Initially assigned to the intelligence branch, most of the scientists eventually went to work in the various Wright Field labs.

Colonel Howard McCoy and the Air Documents Research Center

When Dr. Theodore Von Karman, Director of the United States Scientific Advisory Group, surveyed the massive amount of scientific documents captured from the Germans on 5 March 1945, he sent a memorandum to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, in which he stated, “I rec-
ommend a kind of reference center be established in United States Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF) for such a scientific material [sic] open to all organizations working on the subject. It is absolutely necessary that USSTAF intelligence immediately receive additional scientific personnel, informed on the subject and with knowledge of German.” He realized the treasures in those documents and this motivated the Army Air Force to put out a call for professional scientific assistance in the gigantic task of evaluating captured documents and disseminating technical information to the United States government and industries.

General McDonald assigned Colonel Howard M. McCoy, Deputy Director, Exploitation Division, A-2, USSTAF, with the task of immediately organizing an “American Documents Research Center” in London, England.

The first job was where to put this program that required considerable physical space. A survey of facilities still controlled by the United States revealed that the Signal Corps was gradually moving out of a six-story apartment building at 59 Weymouth Street. This location was most desirable for the new project because it would provide a usable area of approximately 25,000 square feet. About 3,000 square feet of additional space at 11 Bryanston Square were used for administrative purposes.

The effort involved the translation, cataloging, indexing, and microfilming of captured German technical documents. Three hundred people processed over 1,500 tons of documents, gaining from them knowledge that revolutionized American industry. In addition to the aviation-related advances, there were new designs for vacuum tubes used in communications; the development of magnetic tapes used in tape recordings and computers; night-vision devices; improvements in liquid and solid fuels; and advances in textiles, drugs, and food preservation, all made available to American manufacturers.

In London, both the British and the US Navy participated with the Army in the Air Documents Research Center project, yet the Army Air Forces had the largest representation insofar as personnel and equipment were concerned. The British were outnumbered possibly 10 to 1, and the Navy approximately 40 to 1. In the latter part of June 1945, a group of 25 prominent American scientists and engineers, recruited from industry and universities in the states and each an expert in his particular field, arrived to assist in the establishment and operation of the center. The acquisition of personnel between 1 June and mid-July 1945 resulted in a total staff of more than 400.

Colonel McCoy decided that all German air documents would be processed through the Air Documents Research Center without field screening, regardless of the source or agency concerned in the collection. They were to be processed by priority of intelligence: first, those which contributed to furthering the war against Japan; second, those of immediate military interest; and third, those contributing to long-term development and research. As soon as the documents were unpacked and stamped with an appropriate lot number and the damaged ones repaired, they were sorted by primary evaluation into three categories: technical, nontechnical and nonair, and borderline. The technical documents received further processing, but the nontechnical and nonair documents were dispatched immediately to the Air Deputy for Intelligence without further processing and from there to the interested agencies of the Army Air Forces, the US Navy, the British Air Ministry, and the British Royal Navy. Borderline documents were given to a borderline committee for final decision as to their proper disposition.

A comprehensive, modern aeronautical German-English dictionary was not available to the Air Documents Research Center because of the strict military secrecy that had surrounded all operations within various fields of aeronautical science in Germany. The lack of such a dictionary presented one of the first problems encountered by the center in processing German air technical documents. New developments in the fields of jet and rocket propulsion, supersonic aerodynamics, electronics, and other arts and sciences created an entirely new German terminology, which sprang up without correlation to a corresponding vocabulary in research and developments in English-speaking countries. So on 24 July 1945, work began on the gigantic task of finding proper English equivalents for German terms that evolved in the fields of German scientific research. This project ultimately added over 100,000 new technical terms to the English vocabulary.

The Air Documents Research Center did not function extensively prior to June 1945. Documents were not actually cataloged until midsummer 1945, and microfilming was not accomplished until September. Three meetings were held on 8, 20, and 25 August 1945, respectively; and on 4 September 1945, the board recommended that an “Air Documents Research Office” be established at Wright Field under the Commanding General, Air Technical Service Command. There was to be policy coordination with the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence. It further recommended that the operations of the Air Documents Research Center (London) be moved with all personnel and selected equipment to Wright Field no later than 1 January 1946, provided the Wright Field facilities were sufficiently well established. Colonel McCoy became the T-2 director in December of that same year. After becoming the Air Documents Division of T-2, this same function later moved to the Washington, DC area and eventually became today’s Defense Technical Information Center.
Scientific and Technical Intelligence in the Pacific

In the Pacific theater of war, General Douglas MacArthur authorized intelligence personnel to “take complete charge of all enemy crashed or captured aircraft or personnel.” Captain Frank T. McCoy and Technical Sergeant Francis Williams helped organize a Materiel Section for technical intelligence operations in Melbourne, Australia in 1942. In addition to providing information on aircraft and weapons performance, Captain McCoy and Sergeant Williams assigned code names to Japanese aircraft—feminine names for bombers and masculine names for fighters. It may not be surprising that “Frank” and “Frances” became the names of two Japanese aircraft. In October 1944, Lieutenant Colonel Frank McCoy became officer-in-charge of the newly formed Technical Air Intelligence Unit attached to the Far East Air Forces. Interestingly, the nickname “Hap” was originally given to the A6M3 Zero fighter in honor of General Arnold, but turned to “Hamp” after it became apparent the nickname was not appreciated.

The question of who should be in charge of scientific and technical intelligence in the Pacific was addressed in 1943. At a joint British-American conference held in October of that year, the Allies decided that primary responsibility for Japanese aviation intelligence would be centered in Washington. At subsequent conferences among the three service members of the Joint Intelligence Committee (the Navy, the Army Air Forces, and G-2), it was generally agreed that information on Japanese aviation should be coordinated, controlled, and channeled through one central military agency for evaluation and proper dissemination.

Under the service members of the Joint Intelligence Committee, a small ad hoc committee with Army and Navy membership and close Air Ministry liaison was formed to study certain problems of Japanese air intelligence. As of 15 September 1944, this committee delegated primary responsibility for Japanese air technical intelligence to the Division of Naval Intelligence. The Army Air Forces, as well as the Royal Air Force and the Allied Air Forces, Southwest Pacific Area, would furnish qualified personnel for duty with the Division of Naval Intelligence to assist in the execution of this function.

There was insufficient Japanese air equipment available to insure duplicate or multiple samples of more than a very few articles, so it was essential that all such equipment filter to one place to provide satisfactory coverage and to extract full intelligence value. Of the three possible sites considered for the examination of Japanese air equipment—Wright Field; the Eagle Farm at Brisbane, Australia; and the Naval Air Station, Anacostia, Maryland—the Naval Air Station was chosen because it offered unlimited possibilities for expansion. Under the cognizance of the Division of Naval Intelligence, the Technical Air Intelligence Center was established at Anacostia on 28 June 1944, as a joint Army-Navy organization. Facilities of both the Army Air Forces Materiel Command for research and the Proving Ground Command and Tactical Center for tactical tests and flight trials, as well as the requirements of Army Air Forces training and public relations, were to receive equal consideration with similar Navy facilities and requirements.

The Navy’s Technical Air Intelligence Center was assigned the responsibility of collecting, evaluating, and disseminating all technical intelligence on the Japanese Air Forces. This included the handling, storing, shipping, and repairing for test of all Japanese equipment, including flyable airplanes. Field units operating in battle zones were provided by, and under the control of, the center. The Army’s Technical Air Intelligence (Japanese) Division of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence was established on 6 June 1944, to furnish personnel to discharge the Army Air Forces’ responsibility in the operation of the center. By February 1946, the purpose for which the center was established had been fulfilled and the center was in the process of gradual liquidation. It was completely deactivated by early summer 1946. However, the Army’s Technical Air Intelligence (Japanese) Division continued to exist only until August 1945, when Plans and Policy, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, recommended that the division be combined with several components of the Analysis Division, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, to form the Technical Division. Plans and Policy recommended that this newly created division be an operating one for the supervision of air technical intelligence supported by a field installation with the necessary facilities. But the desire to adhere to the fundamental theory that General Headquarters should be a staff rather than operations agency led to a revision of this recommendation, and the responsibility for air technical intelligence was delegated to the Air Technical Service Command at Wright Field.

T-2 Intelligence

The experiences of World War II shaped the future of the scientific and technical intelligence mission. The Air Technical Service Command reorganized into “T” organizations on 5 July 1945. The “T” denoted “technical” and the numbers identified the different areas of military responsibility within the command. One of these was Intelligence, T-2. This change moved the command toward a more balanced integration of engineering and intelligence.

Initially, Colonel John Haywood, formerly the chief of the Technical Data Laboratory, served as the acting deputy of T-2. Colonel Donald L. Putt took over as T-2 chief on 5
September 1945. Colonel Putt came to the unit after serving as director of Technical Services for the Air Technical Service Command in Europe.

On 10 September 1945, the personnel, functions, and equipment of the Technical Data Laboratory’s photographic and informational branches transferred to T-2 Intelligence. The Flight Data Branch remained with the Engineering Division (T-3). Technical Data Laboratory ceased to exist at this time, yet its functions lived on. The administrative offices of T-2 moved to building 262 in Area A (today, part of the Air Force Materiel Command [AFMC] headquarters building). A July 1947 T-2 study articulated a three-fold mission for air technical intelligence:

1. Insure the prevention of strategic, tactical, or technological surprise from any source.
2. Provide intelligence required for command decisions and counsel on air preparedness and air operations.
3. Insure appropriate counter-intelligence measures.

T-2 was responsible for the creation of air intelligence; identifying foreign aircraft and related equipment needed for study; receiving, translating, and distributing foreign language documents; and distributing finished air intelligence products and/or basic data, documents, and equipment as authorized. The T-2 organization initially included Analysis, Air Documents, and Photographic Divisions, as well as the Air Materiel Command (AMC) History Office. (The History Office was transferred to AMC headquarters in 1947, along with other nonintelligence functions.)

As the World War II-related materiel exploitation and document translation programs closed, the technical intelligence section shrank in size. By 1950, only 329 people remained. Also, between 1945 and 1950, the mission focus changed. Although T-2 had established an office to track Soviet weapons as early as 1943, it remained small because German and Japanese projects were top priority. Through the end of the 1940’s, intelligence efforts turned increasingly toward the emerging technological threat posed by the Russians.

T-2 also opened an office in July 1947 for the study of unidentified flying objects (UFOs), popularly known as “flying saucers.” Initially called Project Sign (and redesignated Project Grudge in 1949), the UFO program brought T-2’s successors their greatest public visibility. By the end of the decade, the Technical Intelligence Department

*T-2 intelligence experts examine a German Reichenberg IV manned surface-to-surface missile. The Germans planned “Kamikaze” missions with these, but never carried them out.*
The following is a documentation of the contributions over its satellite states in the 1940’s and 1950’s. fleeing to the West as the Soviet Union tightened its grip administer, or were involved with, refugee camps for people industrialists and foreign military personnel. Some helped ences and trade fairs; others established relationships with from the Soviet Union. Some attended technical confer-

mamment on their background, some collected foreign documents assistance to in-theater US military headquarters. Depend-
ing on their background, some collected foreign documents and equipment, while others gathered information from foreign scientists, especially German scientists returning from the Soviet Union. Some attended technical confer-
dences and trade fairs; others established relationships with industrialists and foreign military personnel. Some helped administer, or were involved with, refugee camps for people fleeing to the West as the Soviet Union tightened its grip over its satellite states in the 1940’s and 1950’s.

The following is a documentation of the contributions of each of the T-2 Divisions as of 1946.

Collection Division

The collection of air technical intelligence documents and materiel from all valuable foreign and domestic sources was the logical starting point for technical intelligence activity. This function was assigned to Collection Division, T-2. That division had the further responsibility of restor-
ing, maintaining, and distributing this collected materiel to be used for analysis, evaluation, and display by interested technical agencies, educational institutions, and manufac-
turers. The foregoing functions were first directed by Colo-
nel Harold E. Watson, who was appointed chief of the Col-
lection Division on 19 November 1945. He was succeeded on 10 August 1946 by Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm D. Sea-
shore, who acted as chief until the deactivation of the Col-
lection Division. Four sections were created to carry out the collection activities: (1) a Liaison Section with three branches—Military, Foreign, and Domestic; (2) a Move-
ment Section with three branches—Import and Export, Aerial Delivery, and Domestic Transport; (3) a Receiving and Storage Section with four branches—Disposition, Records, Warehouse, and Display; and (4) a Technical Operations Section with three branches—Restoration, Maintenance, and Flight Research.

The captured German aircraft and equipment at Free-
man Field were under the supervision of the Technical Operations Section. This field was chosen as the air base nearest to Wright Field that could be used for the location and engineering study of such materiel. Effective 15 June 1945, Freeman Field was transferred from the First Air Force, Mitchel Field, New York to the command jurisdic-
tion of Air Technical Service Command. Policy direction and staff surveillance over the activities of Freeman Field were delegated to the Deputy Commanding General, T-2, and more specifically to Collection Division. The activi-
ties of the field dealt with foreign aeronautical equipment for technical intelligence evaluation and Army Air Forces aircraft for museum purposes. Freeman Field was to per-
form the following mission:

To receive, identify, preserve, assemble, disas-
semble for engineering evaluation, reassemble, display, and store for scientific use and evaluation by Army Air Forces activities, contractors, and technical institutions at least one each of every available type of item used by the enemy or allied air forces; and to receive, restore, and preserve for museum purposes selected and important models of aircraft and related aeronautical equipment used by the Army Air Forces and foreign air forces.

However, Air Materiel Command was relieved of com-
mand responsibility for Freeman Field in April 1946. Ac-
cording to a report by the Collection Division, the field was completely moved out by 29 October 1946 and deacti-
vated to the 803rd Specialized Depot, Chicago, Illinois. The equipment was stored there for ultimate shipment to Patterson Field, Dayton, Ohio, where it would be checked over, renovated, and stored.

By 24 February 1947, a decision had been made to re-
activate the Wright Field museum as the Wright Field Aero-
nautical Review to keep articles of prime interest to aviation (for reference purposes) to be used by engineering person-

cel and research and industrial organizations concerned with aviation. Colonel Malcolm D. Seashore was instructed to contact all Army Air Forces organizations throughout the world for any piece of equipment advisable to put in the museum. Equipment would be loaned to laboratories on the field, sent to Washington for exhibit in the War Department, and loaned to various museums and foundations (especially the Smithsonian Institute, which had been given jurisdiction over the National Air Museum.) Wright Field was to retain whatever items it desired for a museum or trophy room, provided they were made available on temporary loan to Smithsonian should they be desired. It was decided that the Aeronautical Museum building at Wright Field would house this aeronautical review, intended to depict the technical history of the Army Air Forces, par-

cularly as it was centered in Wright Field.
On 4 November 1946, the Analysis Division was directed to take immediate steps to coordinate the transfer of the Liaison and Technical Operations Sections from Collection to Analysis. By February 1947, the Collection Division was entirely disbanded; subsequently, the Analysis Division assumed the dwindling collection functions.

**Analysis Division**

The Analysis Division, T-2, was established as the coordinating agency of technical intelligence activities at the Air Technical Service Command. Unless collected material is evaluated and refined into technical intelligence, there is no reason for collection, and without such evaluation there can seldom, if ever, be any technical intelligence to distribute or disseminate. The program of the Analysis Division included the evaluation of all aeronautical information (both technical and nontechnical) relating to research and development, employment of materiel, techniques, and tactics necessary to insure complete worldwide air intelligence coverage. Foreign aircraft and components acquired by capture or otherwise and included in the evaluation program ranged in size and character from the large German Transport Junkers 290 to the tiniest radar and infrared accessories. In carrying out the analysis program, the division not only cooperated with the various laboratories of the command, but also lent valuable aid to other military agencies and various aeronautical interests.

As originally set up, the Analysis Division was headed by Colonel Howard M. McCoy, who was appointed acting chief on 19 November 1945 and remained in that position until 8 March 1946, when he was succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel Miles E. Goll. Nontechnical evaluation was temporarily assigned to the Air Technical Service Command solely because segregating foreign documents was not possible. Therefore, the Analysis Division was initially divided into two distinct sections with separate administrative and operating groups known as the Technical Section and the Nontechnical Section. The former was to analyze and report on technical intelligence equipment, materiel, and information; the latter was to analyze and report on air organizational and operational intelligence information.

On 12 February 1946, the Foreign Exploitation Section was transferred to Analysis from the Air Documents Division. By 15 April 1946, the Analysis Division consisted of three sections: Technical, with five branches—Airframe, Propulsion, Electronics, Equipment, and Armament; Nontechnical, with three branches—Organizations, Operations, and Facilities; and Foreign Exploitation, with seven branches—Special Projects, Missiles, Measurements, Fuels, Materials, Aerodynamics, and Propulsion.

Among its most important programs as of June 1947, Analysis Division was conducting studies and monitoring tests and evaluation of guided-missile components, chiefly of the rocket-propelled types. Because such studies required diversified, comprehensive knowledge and experience of the highest order, the missiles evaluation projects were divided among all technical sections of the division, parallel but not duplicating projects of other governmental agencies. Coordination was effected through the technical assistant.

Closely allied with evaluation work on missiles were the studies of transonic and supersonic problems in aerodynamics, on which the Aircraft Section (in coordination with Army Air Forces laboratories) had several projects well under way by June 1947. At that time, the Electronics Section was well advanced on projects in radar, infrared, and related fields; the Propulsion Section was expediting analysis and evaluation work on all types of foreign propulsion units and parts; and the Equipment Section was examining and directing tests on numerous items of special and miscellaneous foreign equipment. In accomplishing these evaluation studies, the Analysis Division was aided by the German scientists whose knowledge could be directly applied to analytical problems.

The major purpose of exploiting the knowledge and services of foreign scientists was to expedite the Army Air Forces’ research and development program by adding the successful experience of these men to the technology already acquired. It also provided further opportunity for the scientists to put their more advanced designs and theories through sufficient development to determine their value to the Army Air Forces. As of April 1947, there were some 160 German scientists assigned to Wright Field as alien civilian employees under special contract with the government to fulfill this objective. These men were being used mostly in Engineering laboratories to work on projects paralleling those in the Analysis Division, which provided supplementary intelligence service for the laboratory work.

As of 1 March 1947, about 63 requests had been received from industry for the services of foreign scientists and technicians on Army Air Forces contracts. As many as 12 scientists were out at one time on various assignments, for periods of 30 days (60 to 90 days for exceptional cases). The number of interviews with the specialists from February 1946 to 1 March 1947 totaled 276, which included 168 by contractors and 108 by Army Air Forces personnel. These interviews were monitored by the Analysis Division, and their writings were translated and processed by the Technical Editing Section for publication and distribution by the Air Documents Division.

Because these scientists had voluntarily signed contracts, they were not treated as prisoners of war. At the same
time, their status could not be considered legally as other than that of enemy aliens. It was believed that a good measure of diplomacy had to be blended with security vigilance. As of October 1945, the only specific security restriction imposed by higher authority was that the scientists be “properly segregated from persons not directly concerned with their exploitation.” It was stated, however, that responsibility for security and control was entirely that of the using agency accepting custody of the scientists. None of the group was considered an ardent Nazi, although many had joined the party under compulsion; only a few had to be sent back to Germany. Many of the scientists improved their knowledge of things thoroughly American, and later became American citizens.

German specialists employed were initially contracted under schedule A-1-7 of Civil Service Regulations at rates of pay not exceeding the equivalent of 10 dollars a day payable in Allied Military marks. Under this 12-month contract, their salaries were paid either to their families or their banks, and the scientists were allowed 6 dollars per diem to cover their living expenses here. After a working period of a year with good conduct, the scientists were given the opportunity to sign a long-range contract allowing their families to join them. As of April 1947, 25 had their families join them. Quartered in the old National Youth Administration area, the men had accommodations comparable with those of junior officers in the United States Army and paid for their housing at rates usually charged United States Civil Service employees who occupied such quarters on temporary duty. The scientists ate cafeteria-fashion in a mess hall serving good food at nominal prices. The scientists’ families still in Europe lived in a US-governed housing center.

**Air Documents Division**

The objective of the Air Document Research Board for an effective Air Documents Research Office in the United States was realized with its incorporation into the T-2 organization. Most of the Air Documents Research Center was reorganized as the Air Documents Division of T-2 with the exceptions of the reproduction function, which was given to Maintenance Data Section, Engineering Division; and evaluation, which was turned over to the Analysis Division. Thus, the Air Documents Research Office was in operation under the administrative control of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, but was not identified as an organization in itself. In fulfillment of the board’s objective, the Air Documents Division was to make the information and data contained in the foreign documents available to the greatest possible number of potential users in the shortest possible time. The division carried on the so-called Index Project, already initiated at the Air Documents Research Center in July 1945 as a classified project, to realize this document dissemination to interested agencies.

To accomplish the objectives of the Index Project, a number of functions were delegated to the Air Documents Division, as prescribed on 1 November 1945. The division was to receive, identify, catalog, and classify foreign technical documents and make such documents available to interested agencies. It was to compile and prepare for publication summaries and bibliographies on technical subjects pertinent to the research and development program. It was to administer the Wright Field Reference Library and its branches as required for making available US and foreign technical information. It was to provide translation and interpreter service. As of 21 August 1946, additional functions included the establishing of priorities in processing, evaluating, and disseminating material; making recommendations concerning exchange with foreign nations of air intelligence obtained; maintaining liaison with US and British military and civilian organizations in nontechnical documents; and making recommendations with respect to additional intelligence requirements.

By June 1947, the Air Documents Division had cataloged more than 50,000 documents. Over 300,000 copies of processed documents were distributed in the calendar year of 1946, and it was expected that double that number would be distributed in 1947. In addition, approximately 600,000 unprocessed documents had been screened and forwarded to the Office of Technical Services, Department of Commerce. On the using agency roster of the Air Documents Division there were approximately 2,500 government agencies and government contractors eligible to receive documents or microfilm copies. It was expected that the exploitation of captured documents and materiel of World War II would continue on a diminishing scale for some time, but it was believed that by August 1947, the bulk of the captured German and Japanese air technical documents and microfilms in the possession of the Air Documents Division would have been screened, cataloged, and accessioned. Thus, the original Index Project would be terminated as far as screening and cataloging were concerned, but it would continue for a long time to serve American industry as a valuable research tool.

**Photographic Division**

The functions of the Photographic Division, T-2, were basically those of a service organization as differentiated from an organization performing research, development, analysis, or information distribution duties. As part of the T-2 organizational structure, the Photographic Division provided photographic services necessary to keep the Army Air Forces engineering research and development program dominant in the postwar period. There was also the task of
receiving, reviewing, classifying, cataloging, storing, maintaining, and even reprocessing enormous amounts of photographic film from both foreign and domestic sources, a vital element in the ultimate success of the air technical intelligence program.

The workload of the division was largely a continuation of the work formerly accomplished by the photographic branches of the Technical Data Laboratory, but it was greatly augmented and extended to satisfy the expanded responsibilities and requirements of T-2. The Photographic Division became the major available source of photographic reproduction for the Army Air Forces, as well as for the Air Technical Service Command, because of the cancellation of all Army Air Forces commercial film processing, the transfer of Training Aids to Wright Field, and the deactivation of the majority of wartime Army Air Forces installations performing photographic functions.

During 1946, the Photographic Section responded to 8,145 requests, processed 24,785 negatives, and reproduced 206,306 prints. Its total for projection printing reached 159,105, and ferrotypes aggregated 365,411. The Motion Picture Section received a total of 308 projects, and at the end of the year it had 74 projects on hand (either incomplete or continuous projects).

The Special Photographic Services Section had a total of 105 projects that were completed or closed out during 1946, leaving 71 active as of January 1947. These projects were accomplished for every activity of the Air Materiel Command and certain outside agencies to further engineering, flight tests, scientific development, design of aircraft and missiles, and aeromedical research. Some examples of these projects include the pilot seat catapult, high-speed photography, “Mission Crossroads” (Bikini), and the V-2 rocket experiments at White Sands.

By the end of 1946, the Army Air Forces Film Records Section had identified, assembled, and stored 3,642 reels of captured foreign film. This film was assembled by subjects and prepared for projection so that special groups from the Analysis Division, T-2 could make evaluations. All film that was of no further use to the Army Air Forces was shipped to the Signal Corps in accordance with directives.

**Historical Office**

The historical function in the Army Air Forces was assigned to the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, by General Arnold in June 1942. In the course of the next several months, historical offices were organized in all air forces and commands of the Army Air Forces. There was a definite practical need for maintaining the historical records of Materiel Command as demonstrated by the request on short notice by the Historical Division, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, for a report of the Materiel Command’s achievements for the fiscal years 1942 and 1943. Because no such historical record had been maintained for those years (prior to 1942, the Technical Data Section had prepared annual reports for Materiel Division) and no machinery had been set up to compile such a report, the project was ultimately turned over to Technical Data Laboratory with the expense of considerable time and effort for all concerned.

In May 1943, the Engineering Division recommended that an Historical Officer be appointed and charged with maintaining accurate, complete, and up-to-date historical records of Materiel Command. General Order 38, dated 12 July 1943, pursuant to Army Regulation 345-105, dated 18 November 1929 (as amended 1 May 1946), and Army Air Forces Regulation 20-8, dated 19 July 1943, designated an Historical Officer, Materiel Command, who would operate under the functional control of the Intelligence Officer, Materiel Command, in the preparation and disposition of historical records.

The Materiel Command Historical Office was formally created on 12 July 1943, and assigned to the Intelligence Office, where it remained until September 1944. The Air Service Command Historical Section was established on 7 July 1943 under the Office of Special Information, where it remained until 15 January 1944, when it was made a section in the Control Office. When Materiel Command and Air Service Command were merged to form the Air Technical Service Command on 1 September 1944, the historical offices of the two commands were united organizationally under one chief and placed under Management Control.

This mergence of the offices under one head simplified administration, but the physical requirements of research made it necessary to retain two separate offices, one in each area of Wright Field. On 10 October 1945, the functions of the Historical Office were transferred from Management Control to Plans, T-5, with the reorganization of Air Technical Service Command on the “T” basis. Effective 1 November 1945, the Historical Division with its two components, Historical Section and Museum Section, was made a part of Intelligence, T-2. On 16 October 1946, Historical lost its division status and became a section under Analysis Division, T-2, where it remained until 13 March 1947, when it became an office on a level equal with the T-2 divisions.